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HIRABAYASKI AND K0REKAT5U;

THE STONE COURT'S DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD

T. Seilheimer

Honors College

The law embodies the story of a nation's de
velopment through many centuries, and it cannot be
dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and
corollaries of a book of mathematics.

. . . The life

of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral

and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more
to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed.
.

—O.W.

Holmes Jr.

Law, as a fixed or immutable device for civilized social
intercourse, is a myth.

All too often the law has been construed

in capital letters, and little has it been realized or remembered
that the law has been written by people and interpreted by people.
Rather than the rigidity and permanence of steel and stone, the

law expounded by the Supreme Court has been more like clay.

Case

upon case, decision after decision, the law of the Court has been
constantly re-molded and re-defined to meet the ever-changing needs
of society, and to protect the personal freedoms of American
citizens.

The touchstone for Supreme Court decisions as well as for

Congressional legislation and Executive orders is the Constitu
tion.

It is from this document that the rules by which Americans

are governed are formulated and sanctioned.
withstood the test of time.

Its provisions have

It is not unlike the chameleon whose

adaptive device of coloration insures it a remarkable capacity for
survival.

Like the chameleon, the Constitution has assumed

various colors contingent to the various crises and issues which

have played out their role in American history.

The Constitution's

"skin" of ambiguous words and interpretive phrases has remained,
constant or as substantial as the steel and stone of the Court

building's foundation.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the Constitu-

has remained intact for so many years in this country—from an

agrarian state to an industrial state, from a defenseless coastal
federation to a continental military superpower—through its ca
pacity to change.

Moreover, it has changed and yet retained
1
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broad principles of personal freedom which Americans call "civil
liberties."

These principles include, among others, the freedoms

of speech, assembly and due process of the law which are considered
"absolutes" yet subject to interpretation and therefore unique to

every American. But its paradoxical nature does not stop here.
The Constitution is also a strong social contract binding millions

of citizens for collective security and prosperity yet guaranteeing
each citizen freedom to fulfill their own sense of personal destiny
The effect of such sweeping and contradictory provisions is Con

flict.

Conflicting issues of Government versus personal freedom,

majority rule versus minority rights, and even right versus wrong
are the result of the Constitution's inherent capacity to mean
something unique to every American.

This Conflict has been viewed by historian Herbert

Wechsler as a type of "perpetual question."

It is the Conflict

of constitutional law in which lines are constantly drawn to mark

the boundary between the field of individual liberty and rights,

and governmental action for the good of society. Boundaries must
be drawn to insure the integrity of both with minimal sacrifice

to each other.

Where the boundaries are drawn is a question with

out end, for it must be asked and restated again and again as the
>

contingencies of time and place vary.

Supreme Court decisions act in part to answer this "per

petual question." To study Supreme Court decisions one must study
the Court's decision-making process.

Multiply the complexity of

even one Supreme Court case in only one field of constitutional
law by nine and one has a glimpse of the factors involved in a

Supreme Court decision. Wechsler's "perpetual question" was il-
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lustrated in the Supreme Court's role in Government during times
of national emergency; and it was particularly illustrated in the
Conflict between civil liberties and the war power of the Federal
Government.

Inclusive of this Conflict were the Japanese-American

cases during World War II.

Hirabayashi v. United States and

Korematsu v. United States were the two key Japanese-American

cases which forced the Supreme Court to re-examine the extent to
which the Federal Government could impose its war power upon

American citizens in its effort to successfully engage in, and

conclude, the hostilities of war.

However, Hirabayashi and Kore

matsu were unprecedented in the issues they brought before the
Court, although Supreme Court history has accounted for many

similar confrontations of citizens' rights abrogated by the Federal
Government during wartime.

What was unique about Hirabayashi and

Korematsu. along with other less significant Japanese-American

cases, was the fact that they . . .
. . . brought to our law the first Federal measure of racial
discrimination applicable to citizens; that is, the first
instance in which the applicability of a deprivation or a
restraint imposed by the Federal Government depended solely

upon the citizen's race or ancestry. Furthermore . . . /""they
were_7 the first instances of Supreme Court approval of such
discrimination, whether state or Federal.

Equally unprecedented were the personal, legal, political
and historical ramifications of the cases.

The events subsequent

to December 7, 19^1, ushered in a turbulent confrontation between
the legal and social situation of Japanese-Americans, and the
political and constitutional issues which have always gripped

1Nanette Dembitz, "Racial Discrimination and the Military
Judgment: The Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions,"

Columbia Law Review, XLV (19^5), 176.

this nation in times of war.

Even the Court, still recovering

from President Roosevelt's Court-packing threat of 1937, enveloped

in litigation with the new and ambiguous field of civil liberties,
found its ever-tenuous role in Government threatened even further

in the hysteria-filled and crises-laden years of 19*U-19^5.
But all these over-lying ramifications boil down to one

all-encompassing question: Why did the Supreme Court affirm the
curfew restriction in Hirabayashi and the evacuation program in
Korematsu?

To answer this sweeping question a number of considera

tions must be surveyed and analyzed.

The Japanese-American situa

tion on the West Coast, both in its historical context as an op

pressed racial minority group, and as the recipient of militaryimposed hardships during the early months of World War II, must
be surveyed. Equally important, the extent of the war power of
the Federal Government as defined by past Supreme Court decisions

must be surveyed. Moreover, the mood and historical situation of
the nation reeling under the shock of Pear Harbor and the resulting
war with Japan, even the concept of total global warfare intro
duced and evidenced in these war years, must be taken into
account.

All these considerations relate to the predicament the

Supreme Court found itself in during the time it deliberated on
Hirabayashi and Korematsu.

However, these considerations con

tribute only a minor role in defining the complexity of these
two cases and in determining why the Court reached these respec

tive decisions.

The relation of the Court with the other two

branches of Government, and the decision-making processes of the
Justices who were on the Court during the deliberation of these
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two Japanese-American cases, are the most important considerations.
There is no fool-proof guide for delving conclusively into

the metheds of judicial review and constitutional interpretation

in the judicial decision-making process. However, judicial re
view can be broken down into judicial self-restraint and judicial
activism, and constitutional interpretation can be broken down
into strict construction and broad construction. Since Hirabayashi
and Korematsu evoked constitutional issues, it must be known what
method or methods, or what degrees or combinations, of judicial
review and constitutional interpretation were employed in reaching
these respective decisions. The Justices' applications of re
view and interpretation, as well as their views on the Court's
role in Government especially dealing with civil liberties in

wartime, must be known and shown in relation to these two JapaneseAmerican cases.

At best, however, such a study can only be an

interpretive analysis—open to dispute —into that branch of
Federal Government which has long enjoyed an envied awe and
mystery.
I

The history of the Japanese on the West Coast was one of

continuous, bitter oppression by the majority white population.
With its beginnings in the latter half of the nineteenth century,

Japanese immigrants bore the brunt of racial prejudice which was
transferred to them from their oriental neighbors, the Chinese.

Tagged as "tricky, unreliable and dishonest," they were from the

start objects of suspicion and scorn.1

Nor did the passing years

1Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart and Floyd W.

Matson, Prejudice, War -and* the Constitution-. (4th.ed. :• Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 23-24.
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and generations contribute any alleviation of animosity between
occidental and oriental; in fact, the history of Japanese-Americans

can be surveyed as a series of events kindling the fire of passion
ate hatred between the races which exploded with the attack on
Pearl Harbor.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) posed a symbolic

threat of Japanese imperialism in the Far East and nurtured fears
of a "yellow peril" in the West. As a result, minor evidences of
racial harmony weakened between Japanese and whites in the United
States.

Labor and agricultural groups, patriotic societies and

political organizations worked throughout the West Coast to pass
discriminatory legislation against resident Japanese. The Cali
fornia Alien Land Law of 1913 which barred aliens already inel-

ligible for citizenship from owning state land was specifically
aimed towards orientals and particularly towards Japanese.

The

military expansion of Japan in the Far East during the 1920's fur
thered antagonism between America and Japan and played a signif
icant role towards the passing of the Oriental Exclusion Act of

1924 which cut off Japanese immigration to the United States.
Japan's agression into Manchuria in the 1930»s did little to ap

pease the entrenched suspicions and fears of West Coast whites to
wards Japan and all people of Japan descent; more than ever Japanese
were considered a vile and dangerous race.

Japan's attack on

Pearl Harbor, made while their peace envoy was in Washington D.C.,
seemed to the people on the West Coast proof that Japanese-American
aliens and citizens posed an all-too-realistic threat to their
security.1

llbid., pp. 62-67.
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Resulting from that Day of Infamy were a series of de
fensive and restrictive measures enacted by the Federal Govern
ment and military.

President Roosevelt issued proclamations on December 7

and 8 declaring "all nationals and subjects of Japan, Germany and

Italy who were not actually naturalized to be 'alien anemies.'"
The Department of Justice, long-prepared for such an eventuality,

put into effect its program of enemy alien control.2 Subsequently,
Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt .was placed in charge of the
Western Defense Command (WDC).

It was his responsibility to se

cure the West Coast against any and all forms of enemy hostilities.3
Although the Justice Department and the WDC acted con-

certedly with their respective activities, General DeWitt became
dissatisfied with the Justice Department's administration of se

curity measures and issued a series of "recommendations'" from
mid-December through mid-February in which he requested from the

President an extended authority for the WDC.4 His requests were
summed-up in his "Final Recommendation" issued February 14, 1942,
which asked Roosevelt for direction -and authority to designate

military areas in the "Western Theatre of Operations" for mass
evacuation and internment of all aliens, Japanese and subversives,

as a "temporary expedient" pending selective resettlement. 5
1Ibid., p. 100.
2Ibid., p. 101.
3lbid., p. 100.

4Ibid., p. 102.
^Ibid., p. 110.
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On February 19, Roosevelt complied by issuing Executive •
Order 9066 which ... *

. . . authorized the creation of military areas from which
any or all persons might be excluded and with respect to
which the right of persons to enter, remain, or leave should
be subject to such regulations as the military authorities
might prescribe.

And on March 18, he issued Executive Order 9102, establishing the
War Relocation Authority to supervise the anticipated movement of

Japanese inland from restricted areas already proclaimed by
General DeWitt.2
Shortly thereafter General DeWitt, proclaiming military

necessity, proposed a program of evacuation of persons of "suspected
loyalty and enemy aliens and citizens of Japanese ancestry." He

received full support from the War Department.3 On March 21,
Congress passed Public Law 503 which backed the Executive Orders
by providing penalties for violations of military regulations and

by granting enforcement of these penalties in the Federal Courts.^
Assured of Executive and Congressional support, General

DeWitt immediately proclaimed military areas in Washington, Oregon,

California and Arizona.^

in a series of subsequent proclamations,

1Robert E. Cushman, "West Coast Curfew Applied to Japanese
American Citizens—U.S. Supreme Court Decision," American Political
Science Review, XXXVIII (April, 19W, 266.

2tenBroek, Barnhart and Matson, Prejudice. War and the
Constitution, p. 122.

3s.V. Rostow, "Our Worst Wartime Mistake," Harper's, Sep
tember, 19^5, P. 195.

^Cushman, American Political Science Review, XXXVIII
(April, 19W, 266.

^tenBroek, Barnhart and Matson, Pre,1udicer War and the
Constitution, p. 117*
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he established on March 2k a curfew restriction, and on March 27
he established a compulsory evacuation program for all aliens and
persons of Japanese ancestry.

World War II brewed unprecedented hostility and fear.

The

United States military forces faced the awesome task of rebuilding

its capacity to fight' as Japanese victories in the Facific ap
peared ubiquitous and unstoppable.

Consequently, the winter of

1941-1942 was distressing and nerveracking on the West Coast.

In

mid-December, Elenor Roosevelt spoke for her husband to an anxious
nation via radio broadcast:

I have a boy at sea on a destroyer—for all I know he may
be on his way to the Pacific.
Many of you all over the
country have boys in the service who will now be called upon
to go into action; you have friends and families in what has
become a danger zone. You cannot escape the clutch of fear
at your heart and yet I hope that the certainty of what we
have to meet will make you rise above those fears. ... I feel
as though I were standing upon a rock aiid that rock is the

faith in my fellow citizens.2
In so many words, the First Lady echoed her husband's statement
on "fear" but more importantly she appealed for, and received, a

national unity and obedience under the Federal Government towards
the momentous task at hand—to Win the War.

The new year saw the first of many attacks by the West

Coast press and pressure groups against Japanese-Americans, de
manding that "something be done" with these "inscrutable" descen-

dents of the enemy.3

Cries of evacuation, even internment of

1Ibid., p. 121.
2Richard R. Lingerman, Don't You Know There's a War On?
(New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), p. 27.

3Audrey Girdner and Anne Loftis, The Great Betrayal: the
Evacuation of the Japanese-Americans during World War II (Toronto:
Collier-Macmillan Canada Ltd., 1969), p. 108.
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Japanese-Americans echoed public opinion.
The Federal House of Representatives' research in its

National Defense Migration, popularly known as the ToIan Report,

provided an exhaustive study on the West Coast Japanese-Americans
in their relation to national security, and provided a valuable

rationale supporting the necessity of curfew, evacuation and in

ternment.2

Arguments in favor of curfew, evacuation and intern

ment from testimony and exhibits submitted to the Tolan Report
were summed-up in a later work by Morton Grodzins:

I.

Sabotage, espionage. fifth column: The Japanese were ac

tual or potential saboteurs, fifth-columnists, or espionage
agents,

II • Public morale: Widespread distrust of the Japanese popu-

lation lowered public morale on the West Coast; correspondingly,
evacuation would lift public morale.

III. Humanltarianism: The Japanese (a) were themselves in

danger from actual or potential vigilantees, and the evacua
tion (b) would be carried out with decency and without hard
ship.

„

...

IV. Approval of Japanese militarism: The Japanese in America

had earlier favored aggression in Asia; had been informed of
Pearl Harbor in advance but had not revealed their secret;

and in no single instance gave adverse information about dan

gerous members of their own race to the intelligence agencies.
V.

Migration and distribution: The Japanese had invaded

America by fraudulent immigration, and they had located them
selves in strategic areas.

VI. Culture: Cultural practices (language schools, vernacular

press, sending children to Japan for education) enhanced the
racial barrier to assimilation and were further evidences of
disloyalty.

_

.....

VII# Influence of Japanese government: The Japanese military

government exerted great influence over Japanese in America,
and even American citizens of Japanese ancestry were citizens
of Japan.

1Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps U.S.A.: Japanese Ameri
cans and World War II (New York: Hold, Rinehart and Winston Inc.,
1972), p. 29.

2U.S. , Congress, House, Select Committee Investigating

rise
National Defens

Migration, National Defense Migration: Parts 29,
30^ 31; 77th Congress, 2nd Session, 19^2, H. Res. 113.
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VIII. Race: Because of racial peculiarities, Japanese Americans

were unassirnilable, their thought-processes were inscrutable,
and the loyal could not be distinguished from the disloyal.
Their high birth rate was a mark of special danger.
IX. Economics: Economic practices made Japanese undesirable

competition, and their productive contribution to the nation's
economy was negligible. In any case, evacuees could be em
ployed in productive work at points of concentration.
X. Appeal to Patriotism: Loyalty of the Japanese would be
demonstrated by acceptence of evacuation; if they refused to

co-operate, they had thereby showed their disloyalty.
XI. Necessity for drastic measures: Constitutional rights had

to give way, in total war, to drastic measures.1
Attorney General of California, Earl Warren;2 Attorney General of

Washington, Smith Troy;3 and the Governor of California, Culbert
L. 01son;j| along with many other prominent men in Government,
business and the professions, gave testimony to their respective

opinions in favor of restrictive measures against Japanese-Americans
in the Tolan Report. Only U.S. Attorney General Francis Biddle,

Federal Bureau of Investigation head J. Edgar Hoover, and a hand

ful of other public officials were left to voice the small minority

opinion against Japanese-American restrictions.

These people be

lieved that "the necessity for evacuation /"wasJ7 based Pri~
marily upon public hysteria and political rather than factual
data."5
General DeWitt, the WDC and the War Department concurred

with the public's overwhelming favor towards Japanese-American

1Morton Grodzins, Americans Betrayed (Chicago: The Uni
versity of Chicago Press, 19^9), PP. 400-401.
2U.S., Congress, House, Tolan Report: Part 29, pp. 1097311023.

3Ibid;. Part 30, PP. 11^99-11512.
^Ibid;. Part 31. pp. 11629-11642.
^Ralph de Toledano, J. Edgar Hoover (New York: Arlington
House, 1973), PP. 182-183.
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restrictions.

General DeWitt, a cautious and conservative officer,

was determined that there would be "no Pearl Harbors on the West

Coast."1

It was under the claim of military necessity to pre

vent sabotage and espionage on the West Coast, that he adopted a

program of curfew and later voluntary, then forced evacuation of

all people of Japanese ancestry.2 During the-early months of the
war, General DeWitt said;

. . This is war.

Death and destruction may come from the

skies at any moment.-*
It was also General DeWitt who said:

[ I In the war we are now engaged racial affinities are
not severed by migration.

The Japanese race is an enemy

race.

It was General DeWitt to whom the Federal Government granted large

"discretionary" authority to defend the West Coast.

And it was

under his judgment that military necessity for defense was de
termined.

The WDC acted solely under a military determination

of military necessity through the deference of the Federal
Government. -*

Referring to their lesson at Pearl Harbor, the War De

partment, the Navy Department and the White House were thoroughly
convinced that the first aggressive acts by the Japanese on the
1Daniels, Concentration Camps U.S.A., p. 37.

2Dembitz, Columbia Law Review, XLV (19^5) 201.
3Lingerman, Don't You Know?, p. 32.

4u.s. Army, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Final
Renort: Japanese Evacuation From the West Coast. 1.9^2 (Washington:

G.P;0;, 1943), cited in tenBroek, Barnhart and Matson, Prejudice.
War and the Constitution, p. 263.

^Galen M. Fisher, "Our Debt to the Japanese Evacuees,"
Christian Century. May 29, 19^6, p. 683.
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West Coast would be sabotage.1

With this conclusion President

Roosevelt and his advisors failed to insist on a selective evacua

tion which would reduce the hardships imposed on JapaneseAmericans.

*

Winning military victory was the main concern of Roosevelt.
In formulating war policy, he all too frequently applied the

narrow rule of thumb, "Will it help win- the-war?"3 Unlike Woodrow
Wilson, Roosevelt . . .

... wanted to win the peace with the advice and consent
of the Senate. He could read Congressional signs well and
knew that cracking down on Japanese-Americans would be

popular on the Hill and in the country generally. In ad
dition, F.D.R. was himself convinced that Japanese, alien
and citizen, were dangerous to American security.

Although the nation was committed to a two-front war, and ex

pediency and trust demanded that it hold the military in good
faith for its actions, Roosevelt was not entirely given towards
full deference to military estimations of military situations.

However, in his course of "double-checking" Roosevelt received a

report from.Curtis B. Munson, a staff member under the Secretary of

War; Henry'L. Sjbimsbn, which spoke favorably of Japanese-American
loyalty but stressed the precarious situation of the West Coast

against sabotage and espionage.

Munson's report, submitted early

in the new year, noted how easily dams, bridges, harbors, water

lines and railroads were subject to immediate destruction.

Munson's

*de Toledano, Hoover, p. 17^.

2Fisher, Christian Century. Kay 29, 19^6, p. 683.
3James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1956), pp. ^62-463.

^Daniels, Concentration Car.ios U.S.A., p. 72.
-

Ik

report,did not refute the notion that an indeterminable number of

Japanese-Americans could and likely would carry out such potential

measures of destruction on a moment's notice.1

President Roosevelt,

as well as all the departments of the Government, threw full sup
port behind the War Relocation Authority's program of Japanese

evacuation.2 Little did they entertain the notion of adopting
Britain's security program of screening subversives on an in

dividual basis.3 The Government had already established hearing
boards to screen enemy aliens.

All these hearing boards needed

was the authority to pass upon Japanese-Americans as well.^
II

The Constitution of the United States authorizes the

Government to wage war as well as to protect freedom.

It invests

the broad "war power of the'United States in the hands•of the

President and Congress.

This war power has unlimited scope.

Its

definition and limitation is entirely contingent upon the proximity
and the immediate threat of the forces it is waged against.

In particular, the President as "Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States" has enjoyed in the field

of national defense large discretionary authority; and it has
been this exercise of military discretion which the courts have

1Ibld.< p. 28.
2

Galen M. Fisher, "What Race Baiting Costs America,"
Christian Century. September 8, 19^3, p. 1010.

3Eugene V. Rostow, "The Japanese American Cases--A Disaster"
Yale Law Journal. LIV (19^5), 495.

^"Justice for the Evacuees; Internment of the Japanese,"
Christian Century. June 10, 19^2, pp. 751-752.
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denied themselves any significant right to control.

Eroadly

speaking, the history of the Supreme Court has shown its refusal

to speak about the war power in any but the "most guarded terms."2
The Court has been eager to recognize conjoining Congressional

approval of Presidential actions in order to dispel any overtones
of Presidential unconstitutionality.3 Squally significant, the
Court has been quite "realistic about the constitutional ability

of this nation, led by its President, to wage war."^ The Court
has realized that the urgencies and exigencies of total war re

quire immediate and concerted action, with the success of that
action taken by the war power as its primary goal.

When the

very existence of the nation is in doubt, the war power must
meet the responsibility with the accompaning authority for pre
serving it. In total war "the Court necessarily loses some

part of its needed freedom of decision and becomes assimilated,

like the rest of society, to the mechanisms of national defense."5
When minority and individual rights have been called

into question in relation to the successful execution of war,
the Court has developed its relevant decisions cautiously, case

by case.6 Policy developed through the Court's decisions has
^Clinton Rossiter, The Supreme Court and the Commander
in Chief (New York: Da Capo Press, 1970), p. 2.
»

2Ibid., p. k.

3lbid., p. 6.

^Ibid., p. 7.
• 5Edward S. Corwin. Total War and the Constitution (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19^7), p. ^77.

6Louis Lusky, "Minority Rights and the Public Interest,"
Yale Law Journal, LII (19^-2), 1.
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been.at best piecemeal, as it has been entirely dependent upon

the cases brought before its jurisdiction; the Court cannot develop a case on its own.

1

As an aggregation of hardships, war has evoked varying

degrees of restraint, restriction, and sacrifice. Through the
years, the Supreme Court has had its share of these hardships.
Martin v. Mott (1827) and Luther v. Borden (1849) were two

key cases in early Supreme Court history which established guide
lines of judicial review towards the president's power of martial
rule.2

In Martin v. Mott Justice Story delivered -the Court's

decision granting the President full authority to determine mili

tary "exigencies" with the conjoining power to act upon his de
terminations.

Story recognized the practical need for the Presi

dent's power of martial rule in actual or imminent dangers of in
vasion,3 and it was Chief Justice Taney, in Luther v. Borden, who

spoke for the Court's extension of this power of martial rule.
Taney said the Court could not sit in review of the President's
emergency decisions, lest it overstep its own realm of power into
that of the President's.

Taney also stressed the importance of

respect and trust in the Presidency, especially during times of
emergency.

This was the principle established for judicial review of
1Harold J. Spaeth, An Introduction to Supreme Court De

cision Making (2nd ed. rev.; San Francisco: Chandler Publishing
Co., 1972), pp. 16-17.
212 Wheaton 19; 7 Howard 1; cited in Rossiter, The Supreme
Court, pp. 14-17.

3Ibid., pp. 14-15.

^Ibid., pp. 15-16.
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Presidential military action in these two cases:

When the President decides to use military force to pre

serve the peace, neither the decision itself nor the methods
employed are open to question in the courts of the United

States. In such instances, his discretion mujt control, and
the courts cannot intervene and grant relief.

Ex parte Mllllgan (1866) was a Civil War case which ques
tioned the trial of civilians by military commission.

Chief Jus

tice Chase spoke for the Court with an opinion denying military
commissions jurisdiction over civilians, provided the civilian

courts were open and functioning.2 However Mllllgan, as a landmark
decision affirming the superiority of civil authority over military

authority, has had precious little effect in restraining unusual
Congressional or Presidential action:

. . . No justice has ever altered his opinion in a case of
liberty against authority because counsel for liberty has
recited Ex parte Mllllgan, Judges, too, are practical men,
and when they decide for liberty . . . they do it for better
reasons than the fact that once upon a time a Supreme Court

scolded a /<iead_7 President . . . especially since that same
Court with but one change in personnel had failed to scold

him earlier /~when he was alive_7 and when it might have
done some good.3

The opinion and dictum of Mllllgan had little effect in World
War II.

It was coritended by many prominent legal minds that

Milllgan's doctrine did not apply to the conditions of modern
war.

It was widely and prudently held that areas far removed

from any "theatre of operations" were very much subject to enemy
hostilities, especially by aerial attacks and fifth-collumn aci

Ibid., pp. 15-16.

24 Wallace 2; cited in John Garraty (ed.), Quarrels That
Have Shaped the Constitution (New York: Harper and How, Publishers,
1966), p. 106.

-^Rossiter, The Supreme Court, p. 34.
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tivities.1

Thirty, years passed after the Mllllgan decision before the
Court had a chance to voice another opinion concerning the war

power, particularly that of the President's.

In In re Debs (1895)

a unanimous Court sanctioned the exertion of Presidential authority

against the wishes of a state governor to call out troops "in defense of the nation's interests, property and powers."

2

Although World War I passed without presenting the Court
an opportunity to deliberate on such matters as habeas corpus,

military commissions, martial law and the use of troops, it did
review two cases which challenged the constitutionality of the Es-

pionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Law amendment of 1918.* In
Schenk v. United States (1919) and Abrams v. United States (1919),
the Court upheld the power of Congress to pass these laws and the
Department of Justice's power to enforce them.

4

.,

Also, a-series

of minor cases did develop out of World War I to formulate the

theory of "constitutional relativity."5 As this theory dealt with
conflicts between public interest and individual freedom, it was

insisted by Justices Holmes and Brandeis that issues be restricted
to a test of "clear-and-present-danger" for legitimizing Gov

ernment actions.6 Constitutional guarantees of freedom became
i

^•Charles Fairman, "The Law of Martial Rule and National
Emergency," Harvard Law Review, LV (1942), 1264-1265.
2158 U.S.- 554; cited in Rossiter, The Supreme Court, p. 40.
^249 U.S. 47; 249 U.S. 211; cited in Ibid., pp. 41-42.

^Ibid., p. 42.
^Corwin, Total War, p. 131.

6Lusky, Yale Law Journal. LII (1942) 8.
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contingent upon the exigencies of emergencies.

Civil liberties

were not viewed by the law as absolutes and were subject to limi

tation or abrogation according to demands of public and military
necessities.

In the 1930's the Court again found opportunity to de-'
liberate on, and extend, the war power of the UnitedStates.
Sterling v. Constantin (1932) dealt with judicial scrutiny of a

state governor's decisions in regard to martial law.

2

Chief Jus

tice Hughes spoke for the Court, declaring that . . .

? . . * such measures, conceived in good faith, in the face
of emergency and directly related to the ending or preven

tion of the evil, fall within the discretion of the executive
government." The nature of the power "necessarily implies
that there is a permitted range of honest judgment as to the
measures taken ..."

A court which takes a fair view of the

relation between judicial power and the effective discharge

of other governmental functions will not allow itself to be

controlled by the dictum of Mllllgan.-*

Hughes' most popular statement on the war power came from his
Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell (1934) opinion,
stating that 0 . .

. . . /~itJ7 Is a power to wage war successfully, and thus it
permits the harnessing of the entire energies of the people
in a supreme cooperative effort to preserve the nation. But
even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations
safeguarding essential liberties.

It is significant to note that Hughe*;? statement has often:been
misquoted by deleting the second sentence.

In consequence of the World War I decisions, the Supreme
Grodzins, Americans Betrayed, p. 352.
p

Rossiter, The Supreme Court, p. 17.

^Fairman, Harvard Law Heview. LV (1942) 1289.
^290 U.S. 426; cited in Ibid., p. 1287.
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Court in the 19.3Q"s went out of its way to extend its approval of

the war power as an inherent power.

Such an approval dismissed

federalism as a system of checks and balances—that is, the Court
denied itself extended review pursuant to the increased exercise

of the war power by the other two branches of Government.

In effect,

the Court's deference helped the Executive and Congress further

develop the "constitutional law of war."1'
The Supreme Court under the Chief Justiceship of Harlan
Fiske Stone (1941-1946) faced the difficult task of establishing

an identity, or role for itself during a period of world hostility
and crises.

Still recovering from President Roosevelt's Court-

packing threat, commonly known as the resulting "Court revolution
of 1937;" the Court found its method of judicial review coerced
into the ambiguous realm of judicial self-restraint.

Roosevelt

was blessed with an unprecedented opportunity for judicial ap

pointments.

He needed a Court which would give constitutional

sanction to his New Deal administration and later, to his war

power actions.

By the late 1930's the Court had adopted this

method of self-restraint as its new, progressive role, thereby

shying away from provocative activism and "great dissents."

How

ever, this was not to suffuse the Stone Court in retrogression
or surrender; the relatively new and ambiguous field of jurispru

dence, otherwise known as civil liberties, made its presence known
in the 1930's as a separate branch of constitutional law and was

handled by the Court with an air of caution and extreme care in its
development.

The Stone Court had not yet, in its early years, achieved

1Corwin, Total War, pp. 76-77.
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a stable majority understanding, much less a general agreement,
about "either the propriety or the expediency of judicial super

vision in the civil liberties field."1
unsettling and unsettled lot."

These Justices were "an

In just six terms the Stone Court

delivered fifteen decisions reversing precedents.

There had been

only sixty such reversals in the entire previous history of the
Court.

In dealing with the issue of racial discrimination, the
Stone Court was more receptive towards individual claims than in

any other time in United States history involving this issue under

judicial review.3 However, the Court was less decisive and liber
tarian about criminal procedures, especially when state pro

cedures were challenged and in cases involving "federal arrest and
trial."

In other issues questioning unreasonable or illegal

search and seizure, the Court was again hesitant and reluctant to

speak out in favor of individual claims.* It became apparent
that a "public interest" doctrine was gradually being applied in
issues between the individual and state.
that the Court

But it is worth noting

.

. . . found for the individual in several cases bearing more

directly on the war effort.

Convictions under the Espionage

1Robert G. McCloskey, The Modern Supreme Court (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 51•

^Ibid., p. 53.

-^Ibid., P. 34.

^Ibid..
5Ibid.. p.

40.

6Lusky, Yale Law Journal. LII (1942) 39.
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Act and the Selective Service Act were overturned by narrow

readings of the statutes; a similarly strict- standard was

applied to denaturalization proceedings and to a prosecution
,
.
^„rt/J r.a^Ar^^^ci
But . . . few if any of the decisions
. . . imposed
serious
limits on'the government's actual power to harry individuals

for treason.

In the name of patriotism or national defense.

In dealing directly with the war power of the United States,
the Stone Court discovered judicial self-restraint as a handy tool
for refusing to intervene in frequently resulting political ques

tions and highly controversial constitutional issues which provoked
the practical and realistic limitations of judicial power:
While it considers constitutional liberties, the

Court cannot ignore other constitutional mandates.

The

government's constitutional power to wage war and the exten

sive nature of the war power must be balanced against the in
dividual's constitutional rights The magnitude of civil
liberties deprivation must be judged m terms of the threat
to common welfare.3
M4*.vi o ^r.^
Under these circumstances the Court may work with a pre-

sumpUon of constitutionality. The clear and present danger
test becomes of secondary importance or disappears entirely.

The Court simply asks if the administrative or legislative
lated to lawful ends. If such a reasonable^relationship can

arm of the government can show its action to be reasonably re

be shown, the Court, using this frame of 1«J1^ «™g"J?i

. will declare the civil liberties violation a constitutional
one.^

By the time the Japanese-American cases were reviewed the
Stone Court consisted of Justices Roberts,Frankfurter, Douglas,

Black, Murphy, Reed, Rutledge, Jackson, and Chief Justice Stone.
All but Roberts and Stone were appointed by President Roosevelt.
Justice Roberts and Chief Justice Stone sat on the Court during the
entire Roosevelt administration. Stone was appointed Chief Justice

*322 U.S. 680 (1944); 320 U.S. (1943); cited in McCloskey,
The Modern Supreme Court, pp. 43-44.
2Ibid.

3Grodzins, Americans Betrayed, p. 352.

^Ibid.
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by Roosevelt in 1941.
*

•

III

Gordon K. Hirabayashi was a Japanese-American citizen born

in the United states of Japanese immigrant parents. 'He was a member

of the Quaker faith and attended the University of Washington.

On

Kay 9, 1942, he purposely strayed from his residence after 8:00
p.m., and on May 11 and 12, he knowingly failed to report to register for evacuation from a designated military area.

Hirabay

ashi was subsequently convicted for his actions in the district
court of violating Executive Order 9066, Public Law 503, and

Public Proclamation No. 3 of the WDC.3 Referring to the previous
designation of military areas by Public Proclamations Nos. 1 and

2, General DeWitt's Public Proclamation No. 3 established curfew
hours for all alien Japanese, alien Germans, alien Italians, and

all persons of Japanese ancestry within Military Area No. 1

(which included Hirabayashi's residence in Seattle, Washington)
to be within their place of residence between the hours of 8:00

p.m. and 6:00 a.m.^ Public Proclamation No. 3 was vested of au
thority by Executive Order 9066 and subjected violators to crim

inal penalties provided by the Act of Congress of Karen 21, 1942
(Public Law 503).^ Pursuant to the provisions of the WDC's Public
Proclamation No. 1, General DeWitt issued a series of Civilian

Exclusion Orders beginning on March 23, 1942.

The order applic-

HenBroek, Barnhart and Matson, Prejudice. War and the
Constitution, p. 234.

2Hirabavashl v. United States. 320 U.S. 81 at 84.

3Ibid.. p. 85.
^Ibid.
5lbid., p. 88.

24

cable to Hirabayashi was Civilian Exclusion Order No. 57 of May

10, 1942.

It directed all persons of Japanese ancestry to be ex

cluded from portions of Military Area No. 1 in Seattle and re
quired certain people affected by the order to report on May 11 or
12 to a designated Civil Control Station in Seattle.

Hirabayashi

was convicted, tried by jury, and found guilty of violating both
the curfew order in Public Proclamation No. 3 and the Civilian

Exclusion Order No. 57 of May 10, 1942, and was sentenced to im
prisonment for a term of three months on each count, the sentences
to run concurrently.

Hirabayashi appealed and the Court of Ap

peals for the Ninth Circuit certified questions of law to the United
States Supreme Court for instructions upon the decision of the

case.3
The Supreme Court assumed full jurisdiction and heard the
arguments of Hirabayashi v. United States

its decision on June 21, 1943.

in Kay and delivered

The questions recognized for their

decision were:

. . . whether the particular restriction violated, namely
that all persons of Japanese ancestry residing in such an
area be within their place of residence daily between the

hours of 8:00 p.m. and 6;00 a.m., was adopted by the military
commander in the exercise of an unconstitutional delegation by
Congress of its legislative power, and whether the restriction
unconstitutionally discriminated between citizens of Japanese
.ancestry and those of other ancestries in violation of the

Fifth.Amendment.^

r

It followed that:

. . . /~S_7ince the sentences of three months each imposed by
the district court on the

two counts were

ordered to run con

currently, it will be unnecessary to consider questions raised

1Ibid.. pp. 88-89.

2Ibid., p. 84.
3lbid., pp. 84-85.

**Tbld., p. 83.
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with respect to the first count if we find that the convic
tion on the second count, for violation of the curfew order,
must be sustained.1

Hirabayashi did not deny that he knowingly failed to obey
the curfew order, or that the order was authorized by Executive

Order 9066, or that Public Law- 503 provided criminal punishment
for disobeying the curfew order. He only contended that "Congress
unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power to the military

by authorizing him (General DeWitt) to impose the Challenged regu
lation (curfew), and that, even if the regulation were in other
respects lawfully authorized, the Fifth Amendment prohibits the
discrimination made between citizens of Japanese descent and those
of other ancestry."2 He also insisted that the military should

have imposed a curfew upon all citizens within the Military Area,
or should have imposed it on none.

Without this alternative

military measure, Hirabayashi contended, needless hardship was
3

wrongfully inflicted upon a select few.
It was Solicitor General Charles Fahy's responsibility,

on behalf of the Government, to defend the WDC's curfew measures.

He said the curfew measure was constitutional by its authorization

from Executive Order 9066 and Public Law 503, and argued in favor
of its reasonableness and efficacy determined by General DeWitt.
Fahy reiterated General DeWitt«s belief that the curfew order was
a reasonable and effective measure for the prevention of sabotage
and espionage on the West Coast at the time it was ordered.
1Ibid., p. 85.
2Ibid., p. 89.
3Ibid., p. 95.
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The Court affirmed Hirabayashi"s conviction of violating

the curfew order. Chief Justice Stone delivered the unanimous de
cision. Justices Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge submitted concurring
opinions.

The Court held that Executive Order 9066, ratified-and con

firmed by Congress' Public Law 503, "authorized and implemented"
General DeWitt's curfew order.1
To affirm the constitutionality of the curfew order, Stone

indicated that the President and Congress concertedly authorized

General DeWitt to defend the West Coast. Executive Order 9066
and Public Law 503 were "each an exercise of the power to wage war

conferred on the Congress and on the President, as Commander in

Chief of the armed forces, by Articles Iand II of the Constitution."2
Stone took pains to stress Chief Justice Hughes' statement, that
the war power of the Federal Government was "'the power to wage
war successfully."^ This war power, Stone said, extended "to

every matter and activity so related to war as substantially to
affect its conduct and progress."^ In order to combat the im
minent or present dangers of war, the Executive and Congress must

by given awide scope of judgment and discretion; and "it /~wasJ7
not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action

•or substitute its judgment for theirs."5 Stone also emphasized'
the historical events which surrounded the authorization, pro1Ibid., p. 91.

2Ibid., p. 92.
342 A.B.A. Rep. 232, 238; cited In Ibid., p. 93.
4Ibid.
5lbld.
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mulgation and .implementation of the curfew order; and he referred
directly to the devastation at Pearl Harbor, the early Japanese
victories in the Pacific, and particularly to the military

"findings" that warranted the need to meet threats of espionage

and sabotage suspected of persons of Japanese ancestry which would

adversely affect the nation's war effort.1 In view of the
"findings", known at the time the President, Congress, and the mili
tary based their respective decisions, Stone said they were able
to "reasonably" conclude that their actions were proper and just.
Stone also claimed that the curfew order did not unconsti

tutionally discriminate against citizens of Japanese ancestry.

The

intention of the President and Congress was only to prevent sabo

tage and espionage.3 Although he stressed the fact that racism was
"odious to a free people,"' Stone indicated that the Fifth Amendment

contained no equal protection clause and that it only restrained
discriminatory legislation that denied due process of the laws.

The curfew order was within the boundaries of the war power at the ,

time it was applied, and it was not within the purview of the Court
to scrutinize all the relevant information which contributed to
General DeWitt's "findings," even if racial distinctions were con

sidered.^ The appropriate exercise of the war power was not considered invalid because it restricted the liberty of citizens.
1Ibid.t pp. 93-98.

2Ibid., p. 98.

3lbid., p. 101.

^Ibid., .p. 100.
^Ibid., p. 102.
6Ibid., p 99.

6
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Stone also said that General DeWitt's curfew order was

based on a constitutional delegation of legislative power.

The

curfew order was founded upon a rational basis of information and

was a reasonable expedient for maintaining the national defense,
thus the curfew order was in conformance with the war power dele

gated to the WDC.1
The reasoning of the Court was simple and direct.

The

main issue was the scope of the war power of the Federal Govern
ment:

In the bulk of the previous cases involving war measures,

it had been sufficient for /"the CourtJ7 to refer in general
terms to the great breadth of the war power and in the wide

discretion allowed in its exercise, whether because: (l) the
major question had concerned the interpretation or effect of
the measure rather than its basic validity; or (2) because the

major question had concerned the effect of various specific
constitutional limitations or guarantees; or (3) merely be
cause the Court regarded the fact that the measure was compre

hended by the war power as too clear for debate.z
Ey merely passing on the validity of the exercised war power, and
not on its "rightness" or "wrongness" nor its "wisdom" or "unwisdom,"
the Court avoided constitutional issues where ever possible and

rendered its opinion specifically to the issues explicitly pre

sented in the case.^ The Court refused to pass upon the first
count of Hirabayashi's failure to comply with the Civilian Exclusion

Order, and readily acknowledged the cooperative actions of the

;

President and Congress as the "war power of the United States" in
order to avoid expanding upon the sticky matter of the curfew's
constitutionality.

The curfew order was upheld because it had

1Ibid., p. 102.

2Dembitz, Columbia Law Review. XLV (1945) 183.

^Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the
Law (New York: Viking, 1956), p. 679.
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"some relation" to winning the war and because the Government "did

not have ground for believing" the curfew unnecessary.1 Nowhere
did the Court apply a close scrutiny test upon the reasonableness
of conclusions and actions rendered by the President, Congress or

military, although the Court did perfunctorily review the "findings"
of General DeWitt.

The Court accepted two propositions as "facts" which were
held to afford . . .

a sufficiently "rational basis" for the /"military's_7
decision /"for curfewj. (a) First was that in time of war
•residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy

may be a greater source of danger than those of different anrpqtrv " (b) The second was that on the west Coast m 1942

there was no time to isolate and examine the suspected Japanese
on an individual basis.

The Court reviewed Hirabayashi with judicial self-restraint.

Stone and the other Justices did not find room to speak out a-

gainst the discriminatory affects of the curfew order, nor did
they scrutinize the rationale and reasonableness of the decisions
and actions of the President, Congress and military; nor did they

propose any limitations upon the war power. It was apparrent that
the Court accepted rather than approved the Hirabayashi convic

tion, although this attitude was of no benefit to Gordon
Hirabayashi.

Judicial self-restraint was reinforced with a strict con

struction approach. The Court applied a literal adherence to the
constitutional provisions concerning the war power of the United
States; yet the Court read the Fifth Amendment as a inadequate

protector of Hirabayashi's liberty. However, Stone did state the
Wnri^nc;, Americans Betrayed, p. 353.

2Rostow, Harper's. CXCI (September, 1945), 198
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need for the Constitution's adaptive capacity during times of war.

He quoted Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in HcCulloch v.
Maryland: "We must never forget, that it is a constitution

we are

expounding, a constitution intended to endure for ages to come,
to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."
The Stone Court did considerable Constitutional weaving' to
*

arrive at a predetermined end.

Hirabayashi was the first of many Japanese-American cases

which involved, whether admittedly or not, issues concerning the
extent of minority and civilian rights during wartime.

Hirabayashi

was a war case developed during a time of ever-increasing hostilities
in the Pacific.

The Stone Court, not wishing to obstruct the

prosecution of the war, yet sensitive towards individual and mi
nority rights, were confronted with the "poignant dilemma" faced

by President Lincoln during the Civil War: "Must a government of
necessity be too strong for the liberties of its people, or too
weak to maintain its own existence?"

Surely the Court shared the widespread fears and uncer
tainties about the new technological means of modern warfare.

The

German victories across central Europe in 1940 and 1941 plus the
swiftness which Japan moved across the Pacific proved the awesome

dangers of aerial bombing and attack, land and sea mobility, and

sophisticated fifth-collumn activity.3 The Court was forced to
re-estimate their already diffident stand on the war power of the
x4 Wheaton 316; cited in Hirabayashi. pp. 100-101.

2Barnette case, p. 631; cited in Mason, Stone, p. 681.
3Rostow, Yale Law Journal.LIV (1945) 529.
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United States.

It needed to soberly reflect upon the extent to

which the nation's defense could function successfully.

Never

before was the demand for public safety greater than in early 1942.
Surely the Court questioned the possible affects of re
versing the Hirabayashi conviction:

Would a repudiation of the Congress, the President and
the military in one aspect of their conduct of the war affect
the people's will to fight? Would it create a campaign issue

for 1944? Would it affect the power, the status and prestige
of the Supreme Court as a political institution?1
The careful language and deferential reasoning of the

Hirabayashi decision illustrated many unresolved doubts about the

limits and propriety of the Court's power as the third branch of
Government engaged in war.

Hirabayashi

was but a hesitant step

towards "the formulation of a constitutional doctrine adequate to

the needs of American society in its present state of siege."
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's guiding rule of judicial

review was judicial self-restraint.3 His judicial technique
stressed complexity; he dealt with cases in the light of prece

dent, facts,

legislative intent—according to his own reason and

values.4 Stone appeared to his colleagues as a "pillar of law."
He stood immutably fixed in his conception of the Court's role in
Government and on the function of the law.

On- the role of the

Court he said:

The only check upon our own exercise of power is our
own sense of self-restraint. ... It is rooted in a respect
for the dignity and high purpose of the other ©ranches of
1Ibid.. p. 502.

2Sugene Hostow, "The Democratic Character of Judicial
Review," Harvard Law Review, LXVI (1952) 210.
^Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Supreme Court From Taft to Warren (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), p. 167.
4lbid.t p. 169.
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government, and a sympathetic understanding of the problems
they must try to resolve . . . .*

Courts are not the only agency of government that must be
presumed to have the capacity to govern.

Stone was well aware that legislation may be constitutional even

though it was bad legislation.3 He believed that the law in a
free society needed continuity "... not of rules but of aims
and ideals which will enable government in all the various crises
of human affairs to continue to function and to perform its ap

pointed task within the bounds of reasonableness."
It was Stone's task to harmonize and unify one of the most

divergent collections of Justices in Supreme Court history.5 Stone
found it to his best interest, and to the best interest of the
Court as a whole, to decide Hirabayashi upon the narrowest pos

sible grounds. It was generally agreed that they deal with only
Hirabayashi's violation of the curfew order. Concentrating on
the curfew order's racial overtones, Stone was "jarred" by the
fact .that citizens were subjected to it, but finally reasoned

that, given the circumstances of the early months of the war, the
order was not unreasonable.

Underlying Stone's judicial self-restraint was his be
lief in the need for increased governmental power in the twentieth

century, as exemplified in his general support of Roosevelt's _
^•Rostow, Harvard Law Review, LVI (1952) 2132Mason, Taft to Warren, p. 167.

-^Mason, Stone, p. 6.
4Ibid.

^Mason, Taft to Warren, p. 167.
^Sidney Fine, "Mr. Justice Murphy and the Hirabayashi

Case," Pacific Historical Review, May, 1964, p. 201.
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New Deal administration.1
Justice Felix Frankfurter was one of the leading spokesmen

of judicial self-restraint in modern Supreme Court history.

He

maintained a very realistic view on the power of the the Court:
" . . . The Court's authority—possessed neither of the purse nor
the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its
moral sanction.'0

Frankfurter viewed the war power as an integral part of the

Constitution, and its effective exercise was not to be hampered

by the Court if it adhered to "due process of the law."

He be

lieved that Hirabayashi's conviction and his resulting trial ad

hered to "due process of the law."

He agreed with Chief Justice

Hughes' remark that; "while emergency does not create power, eraer5

gency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power." The
war power, he believed, came under judicial scrutiny for-only its

legal, not political nor social, ramifications.6 War power measures
were to be held constitutional if they•were not unreasonable and

if their military judgments were not unfounded.

It would follow

that Frankfurter would uphold such measures if the proper authorities had some ground for thinking the war measures necessary.

7

1Mason, Taft to Warren, p. 135*

2Spaeth, Supreme Court Decision Making, p. 57.
•^McCloskey, The Modern Supreme Court, p. 54.
^Helen Thomas, Felix Frankfurter, Scholar on the Bench
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins.Press, I960), p. 249.

^290 U.S. 398; cited in Ibid.
6Ibid.
7Milton Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in American
Law (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1946), p. 260.
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He believed that if the Executive and legislative branches were

to utilize successfully their war power, the Constitution would
have to exist as a fighting one as well as a peaceful one.

Justice Hugo Black followed the progressive trend of ju
dicial self-restraint propounded by Stone and Frankfurter.

His

adherence to judicial self-restraint was deepened by his belief in
"laissez faire" for legislators.

It was Black who declared,

during the Court's conference on Hirabayashi on May 16, 1943, "I

want it done on the narrowest possible points."3 It would seem
that Black's sentiments in Hiraba?/-ashi followed that of Stone's.

However, Black's opinions on these two Japanese-American cases were

expressed in his majority opinion in Korematsu v. United States.
Justice Robert Jackson followed the theory of judicial

self-restraint but shared, with Justice Frankfurter, a conjoining
realization of the Court's practical limits of power.

He also

agreed with Stone that judicial activism often led to a judicial

usurpation of democratic government: "/7ltJ7 is my belief that
the attitude of a society and its organized political forces,

rather than its legal machinery, is the controlling force in the

character of free institutions . • . •"*
Jackson had a realistic, although almost deferential, view

1Thomas, Frankfurter, p. 249.

2Vincent M. Barnett, Jr., "Constitutional Interpretation
and Judicial Self-Restraint," Michigan Law Review, IXL (1940), 236.

3Fine, Pacific Historical Review. May, 1964, p. 201.

^Alan F. Westin (ed.), The Supreme Court: Views from the
Inside (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1961), p. 158.

5Ibid.t P. 170.
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of the extent to which the war power could spread in times of war.

He said, "total war means total subjection to the state" and
"military socialization is accepted a patriotic, and dissenters are
coerced into obedience."1

However, he had fears of the war power

extending beyond judicial reach, and that the exertion of the war

power as well as super-patriotism would not be easily subdued

when peace was restored to the nation.2 The preservation of
civil liberties, especially in times of war, depended upon "the

support of an enlightened and vigorous public opinion." Jackson
believed America during World War II did not have this degree of

public opinion.3 It would seem that Justice Jackson upheld the
Hirabayashi conviction because it involved a minor restraint and
was decided on narrow grounds.

Justice Stanley Reed was a moderate; he was a swing-winger

between judicial activism and self-restraint, although his stand
in Hirabayashi and Korematsu indicated a deference to the war

power. Apparently, his only significant contribution to Hirabayashi
was his remark to Justice Murphy:

"Military protection only needs reasonable grounds, which
this record has. You cannot wait for an invasion to see if
/Japanese-AmericanJ? loyalty triumphs.1*
After Stone completed the Hirabayashi opinion, Reed discreetly

commented to the Chief Justice: "You have stated a very difficult
situation in a way that will preserve rights in different cases
1Ibld., p. 157.

2Ibid., pp. 156-157.

3lbid., p. 170.

^Comment on Draft of Murphy Dissent; cited in Fine, Pacific
Historical Review. May, 1964, p. 206.
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and at the same time enable the military forces to function."

Justice Owen Roberts, another moderate, was notorious for
his "slot machine" theory or "plain meaning" approach to statutory

construction.2

There was nothing to indicate that he did not

apply a similar literal interpretation to Hirabayashi's
sutional issues as well.

consti-

As indicated by his silent approval of

the Court's opinion, he believed the military's authorization of
the curfew order was constitutional.

However, Roberts came to

the judicial fore in his Korematsu dissent.

Justice William 0. Douglas concurred in Hirabayashi, but he

was disturbed by the case's implication of racial guilt in which all

Japanese-Americans were considered potential subversives.

He

thought it important to reiterate the narrow grounds on which the
case was decided.3

He anticipated, as did the rest of the Court,

a series of subsequent cases, as evidenced by Korematsu and Ex parte

Endo, which would test the Civilian Exclusion Act dismissed in
Hirabayashi and other issues concerning Japanese-American evacu

ation and internment.11' Prior to the Hirabayashi decision, Stone
wrote to his former law student:

"I am anxious to go as far as I reasonably can to meet
the views of my associates, but it seems to me that if I ac

cept your suggestions very little of my opinion would be
left, and that I should lose most of my adherents. It seems
to me, therefore, that it would be wiser for me to stand by,
Stanley F. Reed to H.F.S., June 3, 1943; cited in Mason,
Stone t p. 676.

2Barnett, Michigan Law Review, IXL (1940) 217.

3panielsf Concentration Camps U.S.A., pp. 134-135*

\onvitz, The Alien and Asiatic, p. 248.
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the substance of my opinion and for you to express your

views ... as you have already done."1
Stone's brief note reflected his desperate effort to maintain a

visage of unanimity in the Court as well as Douglas' ambivalence
towards Stone's decision-to-come.

Douglas said the Court, must credit the military with good

faith and that it was not the Court's role to judge the military's

determination of the curfew order.2

He believed a "temporary

treatment on a group basis /~asJ7 the only practical expedient"
during times on immediate national peril; although he tempered

his opinion by stressing that /~l_7oyalty /~was_7 a matter of mind

and heart, not race."3 He said Hirabayashi went no further than
"to deny the individual the right to defy the law."

4

But it was

to the credit of his foresight that Douglas stressed the need for

loyalty hearing boards whereby "the individual could demonstrate
his loyalty as a citizen in order to be reclassified . . ." on an
expedient basis.

Steeped in an Irish-Catholic heritage, Justice Frank

Murphy was a minority member, of sorts, during his early life, and
he carried throughout his years a crusading impulse for minority

rights.

Courts, despite the confines of their constitutional

powers, had a "mission of justice" to fulfill.

Particularly in

^•H.F.S. to William 0. Douglas, June 4, 1943; cited in Mason,
Stone, p. 675*

Hirabayashi. p. 106.

3lbid., p. 107.

4Ibid., p. 109.
5lbid.

^J. Woodford Howard, Jr.. Mr. Justice Murphy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 343.
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his stand on the Japanese-American cases, Murphy utilized the ju
dicial activist role; whereby the laws of the country should be

harmonized with the needs of the country, and the Court should
act, upon the failure of the other two branches of Government to

act, as the pace-setter for "progress."

Murphy's conception of

"needs" and "progress" lay within the sacrosanct posture of in
dividual and minority rights against Government interference.

Although Murphy concurred in the Hirabayashi decision, he
readily asserted that a state of war did not suspend "the broad

guarantees of the Bill of Rights and other provisions of the Con

stitution in protecting essential liberties."1

He also denounced

"distinctions based on color or ancestry" as "inconsistent with

our ideals."

2

Murphy had a hunch that the military curfew orders

were based on "a priori" assumptions of racial guilt; however, he

defered to the military judgment.-^ But Murphy also stated that the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment provided a restraint on
the Federal Government,as well as citizens when allowing a "measure

of reasonable classification."^

His adherence to the Milligan

philosophy of civilian authority superior to military authority,

however, lost its fervor as he yielded to the differences of

"regulatory action" in times of peace and of war.*
His concurrence was originally intended as a dissent, but

given the pressures of public opinion and colleague Frankfurter,

1Hirabayashi. p. 110.

2Ibid.

^Howard, Murphy. pp. 307-309.
4

Hirabayashi. p. 112.

5lbid.
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plus his sensitivity to his personal standing within the Court,
Murphy engaged in a long, hard re-evaluation of his preliminary

opinion.1 He was also filled with nnagging insecurities" about
a lone dissent in the middle of a war.

As opinion day approached,

Justice Frankfurter wrote an informal note to Murphy, as he en

deavored to pressure him to "close the ranks."
Of course-I shan't try to dissuade you from filing your
dissent in that case--not because I do not think it highly
unwise but because I think you are immovable.. But I would

like to say two things to you about the dissent: (l) it has
internal contradictions which you ought not to allow to stand,

and (2) do you really think it is conducive to the things

you care about, including the great reputation of this Court,
to suggest that everybody is out of step except Johnny, and
more particularly that the Chief Justice and se^en other
Justices of the Court are behaving like the enemy?

Compassion

is, I believe, a virtue enjoined by Christ. Well, tolerance
is a long, long way from compassion—and can't you write
your views with such expressed tolerance that you won't make
people think that when eight others disagree with you, you
think their view means that they want to destroy the liberties

of the United States, and lose the war at home?2

Murphy's deep patriotism and apprehensions of a lone dissent sur
rendered to Frankfurter's biting words.

Murphy concurred on the

narrow ground that there was a rational basis for discriminatory

curfew at the time it was applied.3 He salved the pains of his
surrender with the remark, "/"wJ7hether such a restriction is

valid today is another matter,"^ Discriminatory curfew went "to
the very brink of constitutional power."5
Justice Wiley Rutledge was a silent partner in the strong

judicial self-restraint of Stone, Frankfurter and 31ack.

He con-

1Howard, Murphy, p. 235.

2F.F. to P.M., June 10, 1943, No. 870, Box 132; Cited in
Ibid., pp. 307-308.

3lbid., p. 308.
^Hirabayashi. p. 113.
5lbld.
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curred with Stone's contention of non-judicial scrutiny of mili

tary discretion in military areas.

However, Rutledge believed

there were "bounds beyond which /"the military commander_7 cannot
go and, if he oversteps them . . . the courts . . . have power to

protect the civilian."2 He hastened to add that Hirabayashi did
not question the extent to which military discretion was bound.
Hirabayashi sustained the first substantial restriction

of citizens' personal liberty based on racial distinctions.

Throughout his legal battles, Gordon Hirabayashi was

crippled with the "burden of proof" which, rightly, should have
been the Government's responsibility as prosecutor.

Solicitor

General fahy's reliance on military "findings" rather than conrete

facts—that is, military conclusions based on "not unfounded be

liefs," enabled the Government to substantiate the "reasonableness"
of their war power exertion on a scale which defied mortal op

position. "Generally believed" notions towards Japanese-Americans
as pernicious, inscrutable subversives were regarded by the mili
tary, hence sanctioned by the Government, as valid evidence sup
porting the alleged exigency of the curfew order. It was im
possible for Hirabayashi to refute such "findings" or "beliefs,"
especially when the curfew order was, for all practical affects,
an exertion of martial law—but with Executive and Congressional
approval.

Yasui v. United States was a companion case to Hirabayashi.

Chief Justice Stone summarily dismissed Yasui's contention of the

unconstitutionality of the same curfew order.
1Ibid., p. 114.
2Ibid.

However, the district
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court's ruling also terminating Yasui's citizenship was remanded
to the district court to afford Yasui an opportunity to regain it.

But the major significance of Hirabayashi lay in the path

it cut for the perfunctory majority opinion and the biting dissents
in Korematsu v. United States.

Fred Korematsu was an American citizen of Japan descent

born and raised in California.

Educated in the public schools, he

could neither read nor write Japanese.

He was not a dual citizen

nor had he ever been outside the United States. -Korematsu was con

victed in a federal district court for remaining in San Leandro,

California on May 30, 1942, contrary to Civilian Exclusion order

No. 34 of the WDC. This order, issued May 3, 1942, provided for
the exclusion of all Japanese-Americans from a given portion

of Military Area No. 1 which included Korematsu's residence in
San Leandro, and required these evacuees to report to assembly

centers. Korematsu was prosecuted under Public Law 503 with the

accompaning authority of Executive Order 9066 for remaining within
the restricted area but not in an essembly center.

He was found

guilty. His sentence was suspended but he was placed on probation
for five years.2
Prior to his conviction the WDC promulgated Public Proc

lamation No. 4 on March 27, 1942. It terminated the original ex
clusion, or evacuation program which allowed evacuees to choose
^Yasui v. United States. 320 U.S. 115.

2ten3roek, Barnhart and Fiats on, Prejudice. War and the
Constitution, pp. 235-236.
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for themselves their own evacuation destination, and subsequently
restricted their further movement except as authorized and directed

by the WDC.1 Also, on May 19, 1942, the WDC promulgated Restrictive
Order No. 1 which provided for internment of those of Japanese
p

ancestry in assembly or relocation centers.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower

court decision and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to peti
tioner Korematsu.

The Court heard the case in October and rendered

its decision on December 18, 1q44.''

Korematsu.argued, before the Court, that Civilian Ex

clusion Order No. 34 was without adequate military justification;
the order was geared to prevent sabotage and espionage but was

promulgated'after all danger of Japanese invasion of the V/est Coast,
hence fifth-column threats, had disappeared.

He also challenged

the assumptions upon which the Court rested their conclusions in

Hirabayashi, particularly in affirming the military orders based
on discriminatory "findings" and the alleged exigencies of defense

which necessitated the curfew order.^ . He realized the Hirabayashi
precedent could be detrimental to his case.

Korematsu argued

further that on the day of his conviction "there were conflicting
orders outstanding, forbidding him to both leave the area and to

remain there."6 He contended that Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34
ilbid., p. 235.
2

Korematsu v. United States. 323 U.S. 214 at 221.

^Ibid., p. 216.
\onvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic, p. 255.
^Korematsu. p. 218.

6Ibid., p. 220.
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could not be separated from Restrictive Order No. 1 and that if
detention or internment by Restrictive Order No. 1 would have

"illegally deprived /~him_7 of his liberty, then exclusion order
and his conviction under it could not stand."1

The main issue

then, it was argued, was "whether or not a citizen of the United

States /""could_7 because £" he was_J7 of Japanese ancestry, be
confined to a barbed-wire stockade."

volved two principle questions:

2

Korematsu's arguments in

"... (a) was the /""exclusion^/

order necessary as a war measure? (b) if it was necessary as a
war measure, was It a transgression of the Bill of .Rights?"-'
For the Government, Solicitor General Fahy stressed the
constitutionality of the evacuation program and its efficacy in

preventing feared sabotage and espionage.

4

.

Evacuation was "reason-

5

ably related" to winning the war.

He relied upon the rationale

presented by him in Hirabayashi and emphasized that case's impor
tance as precedent.

It was also in Fahy's favor, although it was

never mentioned, that any governmental action, however unwise,
may nevertheless be constitutional.

Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court.

Civilian

Exclusion Order No. 34 was held constitutional at the time it was
issued and when Korematsu violated it.

It followed' that the lower

1Ibid., p. 221.
2

Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic, p. 255.

3lbid.. p. 261.

^Rostow, Yale Law Journal LIV (1945) 509.
^Grodzins, Americans Betrayed, p. 358.
"United States Department of the Interior, Legal and Con
stitutional Phases of the WRA Program (Washington:D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 4.
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court's decision against Korematsu was affirmed.1

Black be

lieved the order necessary because of the following observations:
(1) The presence of an unascertained number of disloyal per
sons of Japanese ancestry.

9AA4.~

'

(2) Because it was impossible to bring about an immediate

segregation of the disloyal from the loyal, temporary exclusion
of "'the whole group was deemed a military necessity.

(3) Subsequent to the exclusion it developed that about 5,000

American citizens of Japanese ancestry refused to swear un

qualified alegiance to the United States, and several thousand

evacuees requested Japanese repatriation.
,. . , ^ hnT,
(4) In time of war citizenship may carry with it heavier bur
dens and responsibilities than in time of peace; citizens must

recognize the fact that the "power to protect must be commen
surate with the threatened danger."*

Black also referred heavily to the assumptions approved and con

clusions reached in Hirabayashi to sustain the constitutionality
of the military orders and the Executive and Congressional actions
taken which were contested by Korematsu. Black equated the ex
clusion Order in Korematsu' to the curfew order in Hirabayashi by
declaring both of them as reasonable, "not unfounded" and necessary
measures aimed at the twin dangers of sabotage and espionage. Ex
clusion was initiated because curfew was believed an inadequate
defense and security measure.

4

Black dismissed Korematsu's contentions of conflicting

orders forbidding him to both leave and remain in
area where he was convicted. Public Proclamation
March 27, was specifically limited in time "until
extent that a future proclamation or order should

the prohibited
No. 4, issued
and to the
so permit or

1Korematsu, p. 219.

2Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic, p. 258.
^Korepatsu. pp. 216-219.

^Ibid., p. 217.
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direct.1

That future order was Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34,

issued May 3.

Consequently, the only order affecting Korematsu

was the Civilian Exclusion Order.

Therefore, Korematsu was not

subject to punishment under these two orders simultaneously. 2
Black declined to pass upon the provisions included in the

Exclusion Order and Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1 which re

quired persons of Japanese ancestry to report to assembly centers,
subject to subsequent detention in assembly or relocation centers.
The issues that concerned the subsequent detention program were

not introduced or resolved at the lower court level.

The Court's

sole concern was Korematsufs violation of the Exclusion Order:

Since the petitioner has not been convicted of failing
to report to remain in an assembly or relocation center, we
cannot in this case determine the validity of those separate
provisions of the order. It is sufficient here for us to
pass upon the order which petitioner violated. To do more
would be to go beyond the issues raised, and to decide momen
tous questions not contained within the frame work of the

pleadings or evidence in this case . • • ^

The Exclusion and Restrictive Orders fromulated a three-step re

quirement procedure for the Japanese evacuation program. Each re
quirement imposed distinct, separate' duties. A violation of one
did not necessarily denote violations of the other two.

Korematsu

violated the first-step requirement; whether he would have (2) failed

to report to and temporarily remain in an assembly center, or (3)
failed to be evacuated to a relocation center, was irrelevant to
the

case.

4

17 Fed. Reg. 2601; cited in Ibid., p. 220.

2Ibid.
3Ibid.. p. 222.

^Ibid., pp. 221-222.
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Black dismissed Korematsufs final argument claiming the
invalidation of the Exclusion Order because it led to subsequent
detention:

. . . The power to exclude includes the power to -do it by
force if necessary. And any forcible measure must necessarily
entail some degree of detention pr restraint whatever method
of detention is selected • . • .

The order in which Korematsu was convicted was valid even though
evacuation and detention were inseparable.

The Exclusion Order re

quired him to leave the designated area only by way of an assembly
center.c

Black also denied any alleged racial overtones to the Ex
clusion Order: "To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice,
without reference to the real military dangers which were pre

sented, merely confuses the issue."^

He stressed the importance

of holding the military in good faith, and reiterated as well
the priorities of public necessity and immediacy of security
4

measures during times of national emergency.

Despite Justice Black's unquestioned devotion to civil
liberties, he adopted, in times of national emergency the legal
maxim: "The welfare of the people is the supreme law."

He tradi

tionally upheld governmental action in extraordinary circumstances,
such as war; although he declined to do the same under peaceful

or "normal" circumstances.^

In the Japanese-American cases, he

1Ibid., p. 323.

2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4

*Ibid.
^Charlotte Williams, Hugo Black. A Study in the Judicial

Process (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1950), p. 165.
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saw racial distinctions, rather than racial discrimination in the

military "findings" and actions. He believed his Korematsu opinion

was justified, given the extraordinary conditions it encompassed.1
However, during the time Black wrote his opinion, it was generally
understood that wartime controls, such as the detention or intern

ment program, would soon be modified if not discontinued. It
was on March 11, 1943—exactly eight months prior to the first
Court hearings on Korematsu-that the director of the War Relo
cation Authority first suggested repeal of evacuation and exclu2

sion orders.

Black used the judicial self-restraint role to his ad

vantage; he declined to make any serious constitutional waves con

cerning the nation's "power to protect" and held the Court to what
he believed a consistent and realistic effort in support of the

Hirabayashi precedent. In Korematsu. as with Stone in Hirabayashi,
Black adhered to a strict construction approach by recognizing

the war power of the United States without interpretative limita
tion and by construing the military orders at their face value
without acknowledging their racist affect upon Japanese-Americans.
But it Was to Black's credit that he decided in favor of
several Japanese-American petitioners in matters separated from

the issue of national emergency: "He /"denounced.? a California
statute forbidding ownership of-agricultural lands by aliens in

eligible for citizenship on the ground that it /~denied_7 them
the equal protection of the lawS3. . .and upon the same reasoning
1Ibid., p. 166.

2Mason, Stone, p. 677.
3rwama v. California. 332 U.S. 633 <19W); cited in
Wi lliams.

Black, p. 166.
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he struck down a California law which forbade the issuance of com

mercial fishing liscences to the same group."

In assigning the opinion to Black, Chief Justice Stone im

pressed upon him that it should not indicate any more than that the
war power existed and that it had been reasonably exercised. In
an early draft, Black said:

"Nothing short of apprehension of the gravest imminent
danger to the public safety can constitutionally justify either
curfew or detention at assembly centers." "I think you should
qualify this sentence," Stone suggested, "so to show, as we
were at pains to show in the Hirabayashi case, that it is not
our apprehension or our judgment of the gravity and imminence
of the darker which governs, but that of the military authori
ties charred with the responsibilities in the premises, pro

vided only there is a basis for their judgment. Knowing your
attitude about these matters, I am sure you will agree that
it is important for us to make it plain that we do not impose
our judgment on the military unless we can say they have no

ground on which to go in formulating their orders."

Stone had originally intended to submit a concurring opinion
to explain why ...

". . .we are not free to decide petitioner's main contention
that a relocation order applied to him would be unconstitutional.
... He has been convicted of violating an Act of Congress;
Entrance into an assembly center did not automatically pre

sume detention under a relocation order.

Many who were sent^

to the assembly center were not sent to'.relocation centers, but
instead'were released and sent out of the military area. We

cannot say that petitioner would not have been released, as
others were."--'

Stone sent this concurring opinion to Black.

It appeared by reading

Black's final opinion, that Stone felt he would not need to submit
a final concurring opinion upon the day Korematsu was read In Court.
1Takahashl v. Fish and Game Commission. 334 U.S. 410 (1948);
cited in Ibid., p. 167.

2H.F.S. to H.B., November 9, 1944; cited in Mason, Stone,
pp. 677-678.

3H.F.S. to H.B., November 9, 1944; cited in Ibid., p. 678.

49

Justice Frankfurter Filed a concurring opinion.

He agreed

with Black's opinion affirming the necessity of the Exclusion
Order as a war measure and re-emphasized the nation's need to

maintain a fighting Constitution as well as a peaceful' one. He
approved of the Exclusion Order because he believed it to be an

appropriate means for successfully conducting the war.

He

equated the Constitution with reason—that is, the Exclusion Order
was constitutional because it was reasonably judged necessary by

the military insofar they had "some grounds" for fearing dangers

of sabotage and espionage.2 But Frankfurter's "reason" method was
deceptive; for it was impossible, much to Korematsu's misfortune,
to disprove that there were not "some grounds" for fearing Sabotage
and espionage, and reason had little to do in civil court which
dealt with miltary judgments that relied considerably upon hearsay
and conjecture.

But the substance of his consurrence implied an awareness

of the difficulty of Korematsu to prove his contentions, and yet an

understanding of the untold constitutional ramifications of the
case's issues.

Although he acknowledged the authority and ex

pediency of the military's actions, he did not approve them:
To find that the Constitution does not forbid the military

measures now complained of does not carry with it approval of
that which Congress and Executive did. That is tneir business,
not ours.3

Frankfurter appeared to take a position between Black and
the dissents of Roberts, Murphy and Jackson with his apparent
^•Korematsu, p. 224.

2Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic, pp. 259-260.
•^Korematsu. p. 225.
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desire to elaborate upon the bounds in which the military could

function constitutionally.

But his judicial self-restraint held

wholly in the context of war;

him to view Korematsu

the Consti

tution provided extraordinary powers during extraordinary times,
and it was not the Court's role to constantly meddle in the affairs
of the war power in these extraordinary times.

That action is not to be stigmitized as lawless because like

action in times of peace would be lawless .... If a military
order . . . does not transcend the means appropriate for con

ducting war, such action by the military is . . . constitu
tional . . . .

Frankfurter's method of self-restraint was geared toward preserving

the vitality of the war power with little concern for "righting all
3

the wrongs" that could flow from its exercise.

In an address in

the fall of 1942, he said the supreme task for the United States
was the successful conclusion of the war and that "any interest or

issue that stood in its way should be put aside."

He looked upon the Constitution as an organic whole, whereby
all of its clauses were on an equal footing.

Therefore, he re

jected any "preferred freedoms" doctrine, especially when.it con-,
flicted with public interest, such as the efficacy of Government
5

power during wartime.•*

The main reason why the Court declined to pass upon

Korematsu's contention of the invalidity of Restrictive Order No. 1

lrtSupreme Court and Radicalism: Korematsu Case," Nation,
December 30, 1944, p. 788.
2

Korematsu. pp. 224-225.

^Thomas, Frankfurter, p. 2480
4Ibid., p. 244.
5Ibid.. pp. 195-196.
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was revealed in" its subsequent decision in Ex parte Endo.1

De

livered on the same day as Korematsu the Court reversed the lower

court's decision denying Kiss End'o's suing for writ of habeas
corpus to gain her freedom from a relocation center.
said the War Relocation Authority could not detain

loyal and law-abiding citizen of the United States.

The Court
a "concededly"

2

Justice

Douglas delivered the unanimous decision of the Court.

In his silent agreement in Korematsu Justice Douglas was

apprehensive about sanctioning the implied racial guilt of JapaneseAmericans as potential saboteurs in the military decision for ex

clusion but placed an extraordinary faith in the good intentions of
the War Relocation Authority to screen the loyal from the disloyal

on an expedient basis.

His failure to speak out in Korematsu was

also due to his belief that the military was carrying out its job

as it thought best, and to his subsequent opinion in Endo which
stressed the temporary nature of the whole Japanese-American program

and the legal measures open to these citizens to regain their free
dom.

The Korematsu decision was accompanied with biting dissents

from Justices Roberts, Murphy and Jackson.

Where the majority of

the Court acknowledged dispassionate racial distinctions, the minority

found rampant racial prejudice.

When Korematsu was debated in late

1944, the war in the east and west appeared to be certain of Allied
victory, and these Justices found less outside pressure restraining
their individual views.

They were no longer willing to sanction all

military decisions and actions unquestioningly.

^•Sx parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283.

2Ibid., p. 226.
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Justice Roberts, as did Murphy and Jackson, looked beyond

the narrow scope of review used by the majority of the Court toward
the broad effects and implications of the confusion between the
Exclusion Order and Fublic Proclamation No. 4.
Roberts dissented because "the Indisputable facts exhibit

a clear violation of constitutional rights."1

"... Z""l_7t is the

case of convicting a citizen as punishment for not submitting to

imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and
solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or enquiry con

cerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United States
."2

He believed the Constitution to be color-blind and thus he

could not grant constitutionality to military actions based on
racial discrimination.

Roberts believed the confusion between Public Proclamation

No. 4 and the Exclusion Order was intentionally constructed to

force Korematsu to evacuate his residence by way of an assembly

center and subsequent internment in a concentration camp.3
The Government has argued this case as if the only order

outstanding at the time the petitioner was arrested . . . was
Exclusion Order No 34 ordering him to leave the area in which
he resided, which was the basis of the information against

him . . . . This, I think, is a substitution of an hypothetical

case for the case actually before the Court ....

He also disagreed with the narrow ground upon which the

majority decided, especially their sanctioning the validity of
the

.

.

.

^Korematsu, p. 225.

2Ibid., p. 226.
3lbid., pp. 229-230.

^Ibid., p. 231.
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• • • /~t_J7emporary -Exclusion Order under which the residents
of an area are given an opportunity to leave and go elsewhere
in their native" land outside the boundaries of a military area.
To make the case turn on any such assumption is to close our

eyes to reality.1
Roberts' silent concurrence in Hirabayashi could not sus

tain a similar opinion in Korematsu.

His dissent was enfluenced by

a detailed perusal of facts relating, and leading,to* Korematsu's
conviction which led him to distrust the reasonableness of the

military judgments and to condemn the governmental actions which
authorized'the'entire Japanese-American program of curfew, evacuation
and internment.

Roberts believed the majority had determined too

broadly the extent to which the war power could infringe upon civil
liberties.

He concurred in Endo but questioned whether or not Endo's

detention violated "the guarantees of the Bill of Rights of the
Federal Constitution and especially the guarantee of due process

of law."2

In Endo Roberts again displayed a factual analysis of

the issues as in his Korematsu dissent.

Whatever misgivings or apprehensions Justice Murphy held
with the reasoning of Stone's Hirabayashi opinion, he felt con
strained to withold them no longer with Black's provocative Kore

matsu opinion.

When Murphy learned that Black wrote his opinion

citing the principles of Hirabayashi as the basis for upholding i
the Exclusion Order, Murphy exploded, "The Court has blown up on

the Jap case—just,as I expected it would."3 Murphy believed the
1Ibid., 232.
2Endo..p. 310.

^Murphy Letter to Gene /"Eugene Gressman_7, undated, Box
183, Murphy Papers; cited in Fine, Pacific Historical Review, May,
1964, p. 208.

'

9>

issues raised in Korematsu were far more serious than those in

Hirabayashi yet the Court failed to apply a tougher method of re
view towards the military justification for the more punitive
Exclusion Order. »/~T-7"is exclusion ... on a plea of military

•necessity in absence of martial law ought no to be approved ... ."
Murphy dissented primarily on the irrationality of the
military decisions for evacuation. He did not challenge the means
in which the Court determined the reasonableness of the military
decisions. Nor did he work with evidence other than that presented
before the Court. He also acknowledged the power of the President
and Congress to authorize wide discretion to the military in
wartime. But he maintained that the evacuation was "insupportable
even under the Court's limited review."2 He said,
the exclusion, either temporarily or permanently, of

all persons with Japanese blood in their veins has no such
rea.La^le relation £ towards the prevention of sabotage and
esoionaoe 7 . . . because fitJ must rely . . . upon the as

sumption tha£ 4ll persons of Japanese ancestry may have a
dangerous tendency to commit sabotage ana espionage . . .

•
Jusltncation ./. sought ...^ ^ y S H S
. racial and sociological grounds not ordinarily within the

realm of expert military judgment, supplemented by certain
semi-military conclusions drawn from an unwarranted use of
circumstantial evidence . . .-*

Murphy carefully perused the logic and alleged rationality of the
"findings" in General DeWitt's Final Report. He cited expert in

dependent studies supplying sociological data to refute the validity
of most of the evidence and conclusions on which General DeWitt
based his orders.4 Murphy wanted to determine the "rightness" or
1Korematsu. p. 233*

2Howard, Murphyt p. 304.

-^Korematsu, pp. 235-237.

^Ibid., p. 240a

«

.

»
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"wrongness" of the Exclusion Order, which was precisely what
Frankfurter held that the Court should not do.

He stated that

the Exclusion Order ignored the fundamental constitutional prin

ciple of individual guilt as the sole basis for deprivation of

rights.1 He believed that the assertion "time was of the essence"
was false.

He stated that four months had elapsed after Pearl

Harbor before the first Exclusion Order'was issued and that eleven

months had elapsed before evacuation was complete.

Also, claims

of military necessity did not seem so urgent or real when, it was
conceded that martial law was not initiated on the West Coast.
The F.B.I, and the military and naval intelligence services were

well-informed and adequately equipped to prevent any dangers of

sabotage and espionage.2 Murphy concluded, "I dissent, therefore,
3

from this legalization of racism . . .

He also found the Exclusion Order, as well as the earlier

curfew Order, defective by due process standards.

Although he

assumed the Fifth Amendment contained no equal protection clause,

it did provide that due process, at some point, prohibited ir
rational 'discrimination.

The Exclusion Order, he claimed, was

based on irrational racial discrimination, and therefore deprived

Japanese-Americans the scope of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of
equal protection of the laws.

4

Murphy's evangelism and-identification with underdogs, .- whether Jehovah's Witnesses, Indians, or even businessmen, seemed
1Ibid.

2Ibid., p. 241.

3Ibid., p. 242.

^Howard, Murphy. p. 304.
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to set him apart from his colleagues with an extra-sensitivity in

favor of minority rights.1 His different perspective on the same
information the Court dealt with in Korematsu led him to different
conclusions about the "reasonableness" of military decisions, and

the need for tough judicial scrutiny of military power infringing
upon the constitutional rights of minorities.

Concurring in Endo. Murphy joined the opinion of the

Court but reiterated his declamation on the "unconstitutional re

sort to racism inherent in the entire evacuation program," and stated
that Miss Endo's "unconditional" release by the War Relocation
Authority implied the right to move freely into California in

spite of military orders prohibiting her return to that state.
Korematsu and Endo allowed Murphy to express his philosophy

of judicial activism. He treated the Supreme Court as the vehicle
needed to realize humane ideals, or-as he ambiguously stated, "the
American Dream."3

Justice Jackson's sense of judicial self-restraint led

him to submit a contradictory and confused dissent.

He agreed

with Murphy's criticism of the inherent racism in the evacuation
program but refused to say whether or not General DeWitt«s orders
were reasonable; in fact, he claimed that there was no way for
him to discern their reasonableness at all.

4

He agreed with Roberts'. claim on the apparent contradic
tory provisions of Public Proclamation No. 4 and Civilain Ex1Ibid., p. 337.

2Endo, pp. 307-308.
^Howard, Murphy, p. 307.

^Daniels, Concentration Camps U.S.A., pp. 139-140

•
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elusion Order No. 34, and reiterated Murphy's statement on guilt

being personal and not inheritable or collective.

However, he

did not attempt to define any limits upon the scope of the war

power restricting the liberties of citizens.

The main thrust of the

dissent asserted that the Court should not become an instrument of

military policy by affirming or justifying military decisions and
»

actions:

But if we cannot confine military expedients by the Con

stitution, neither would I distort the Constitution to approve
all that the military may deem expedient. That is what the
Court appears to be doing, whether consciously or not ....

/~0j7nce~a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show
that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes
the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such

an order, the Court for all times has validated the principle
of racial discrimination ....
The principle then lies
about like a loaded wXeapon ready for the hand of any authority

that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.^

Jackson's silent approval of the Hirabayashi decision, with

Stone's guarded language and the minor restraint at issue, ceased
to be silent upon Black's illogical reasoning equating the mild
curfew Order of Hirabayashi to the harsh Evacuation Order of Kore
matsu:

Now the principle of racial discrimination is pushed from
support of mild measures to very harsh ones, and from temporary

deprivations to indeterminate ones. And the precedent which
it is said requires us to do so is Hirabayashi. The Court is
now sayins- that in Hiraba?/ashi we did decide the very things
we said we were not deciding . • . .^
Jackson's dissent contradicted his belief that wartime and

peacetime were overlapping, inter-related situations.

Although

he would "reverse the judgment and discharge the prisoner" he would
Korematsu. p. 243.

2Ibid.. pp. 244-245.
3lbid., p. 246.

^Ibid., p. 247.
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not set any limits or guidelines to prevent such deprivations of
civil liberties in the future. Granted his dissent would not es
tablish a "bad" war precedent to be employed during times of peace,
it would also not guarantee freedom, to whatever extent, in times
of war. In effect, he had confidence in the public that they would

regain their freedoms in quieter times, although he really believed
the public was not capable of doing so. "Jackson probably realized
he would likely be shouting into the wind, had his dissent been

the majority opinion. Instead, he hoped the nation would struggle
out of the rigors of war unscathed in the realms of peacetime con
stitutional law.1
In Korematsu the Court did not explicitly state that the

Exclusion Order was wise or necessary but it did affirm its legality

They abandoned all tests of clear-and-present-danger towards mili
tary judgments, failed to consider whether alternative measures
less drastic than exclusion were adequate to meet feared espionage
and sabotage, and thus accepted the military judgments favoring

exclusion without qualification.2 By treading lightly on the
main issue—the scope and method Of'judicial review of military
decisions and the war power-they avoided the risks of overruling

an important part of the Government's war policy.

Except for

perhaps a showing of malice and lack of good will on the part of
the military, Korematsu indicated that there was no basis for in
validating wartime action by military authorities.

1Westin, The Supreme Court: Views, pp. 31,170.
2Grodzins, Americans Betrayed, p. 354.
3Rostow, Yale Law Journal. LIV (1945) 503.
^Dembitz, Columbia Law Review. XLV 193.
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The Court faced in Korematsu as well as

in Endo the first

program of protective custody exercised by the United States on

a mass basis.

Korematsu immersed the Court in a boiling vat of

controversy in which the life of the Court as a powerful third
branch of Government was at stake as much as the viability of
i

minority rights during wartime.

But the Court s decision along

with Hirabayashi. however guarded and limited in review; weakened
civilian control over the military by defering to military

"findings" as facts, failed to speak about the scope of the war

power when it infringed upon civilian freedoms, and transformed
Japanese-Americans to second-class citizens by allowing the
military to restrict their freedom solely on racial grounds and
by denying them even the palest protection under the Fifth Amend
ment.
V

The Stone Court's Hirabayashi and Korematsu decisions

wrote a tragic chapter in the annals of American civil liberties.
The Court wrestled with Wechsler's "perpetual question" during

the most devasting and fearsome war in this nation's history.
America defeated totalitarian enemies in Europe and in the Pacific.

America also liberated foreign citizens abroad but incarcerated
its own citizens at home, all in the name of Freedom.

The Court

was forced to rationalize racism as an inherent principle in the

Constitution which, during the 1930's and early 1940's, was con
strued as the safeguard for civil liberties and minority rights.
But these two decisions of the Court must be tempered by the ex-

1Ibid., p. 117.
2Rostow, Harper's, CXCI (September 1945), 198.
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tenuating circumstances of a nation committed to total war against

a totalitarian enemy.

Hirabayashi and Korematsu were products of

war; however these decisions, like war, should not be exonerated
from the atrocities to human freedom and dignity they committed,

but rather, should give rise to a public understanding and indig
nation so that their resurgence shall never again occur in the lives
of free people.

The overall affect of these two decisions was a Court con

stitutionalization of Executive Orders and Congressional legisla-

tion, and the admissibleness in court of military .half-truths, all
of which were products of war hysteria and geared, whether admittedly

or not, towards the abrogation of constitutional rights of Americans
in times of national emergency.

Citizenship and loyalty were de

termined not by heart or mind, but by race.

Curfew and evacuation

orders were impressed upon citizens as well as aliens by-the au

thority of the nation's v/ar power.

In 1950, Congress passed the

"Emergency Detention Act" which gave the President and the Attorney
General the statutory right to set up concentration camps for

the detention of persons "who there is reasonable grounds to be
lieve will commit , or conspire to commit sabotage and espionage .

. . .m1

However, this Act was revised in September, 1971.

Con

spiracy as well as evasion of apprehension and aiding evasion of
apprehension were no longer grounds for detention unless subject
2

to a pursuant Act of Congress.

1Daniels, Concentration Camps U.S.A., p. 143.
Administrator of General Services by the Office of the
Federal Register. National Archives and Records Service, United
States Statutes At Large, CXXXV 91971), 347-348.
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Placed in its proper historical context, the relationship
between the Court and the war power in dealing with the supres-

sion of civil liberties in times of national emergency has evoked,

up to this post-war era, a number of observations: Relevant cases
have continued to be shaped by the President and Congress; it has

been difficult, if not impossible, to place definitive judicial
scrutiny upon any war power actions which work questionable in

trusions upon civil liberties to do anyone any good, because such
intrusions raise issues so politically explosive that the notion

of "government by lawsuit" becomes unthinkable; whatever limits
the Court has placed upon the war power have been largely theoret
ical rather than practical; the Constitution has split into two,

serving both peace and war; the "reasonable" basis in which all
actions of the war power are justified in the "fighting" Consti

tution are predicated upon the law's fictitious "reasonable and

prudent man," which has been, after all, manifested in the Presi
dent of the United States.1 Any actions taken by the military,
if found to be "reasonably" based, are constitutional, provided
the military has the constitutional sanction of the war power.

The Stone Court could not strike down General DeWitt's military
orders as unreasonable without directly striking down the "rea
sonableness" of Roosevelt's Executive Orders and Congress'

Public Law 503.

No Court has dared to condemn a President as

an unreasonable man during times of declared war.

No Court has

dared to declare the military incompetent without serious con

sequence of national scorn, especially during wartime when the
nation's very existence depends upon the military to success-

iRossiter, The Supreme Court, pp. 126-131.
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fully carry-out its job. When the nation's very existence is
at stake its citizens have no choice but to hold a credulous trust
in the military; and should "our men in uniform" infringe upon

the personal freedoms of citizens, it should be held by those
citizens who are infringed upon that they do so not from an itch

for power but rather from misconception, excusable human error,
or from honest efforts of defense commensurate to the threatening
outside danger.

The Hirabayashi and Korematsu decisions reflected popular

public opinion at the time they were delivered. But it must be
stressed again that the Stone Court accepted rather than approved
the actions of the war power and military.

Hirabayashi and

Korematsu were glutted with the dicta of Stone, Black, Frankfurter,

Jackson, Rutledge and Douglas denying themselves and the Court
any competence to review military estimates of military situations,
or the authority to chance a crippling effect upon the war

power's effort to preserve the nation. The Court was forced to
carry-out a thankless job which no one, save General DeWitt the
militarist-zealot, wanted. No court could have taken pride in
confining American citizens into their homes and in harrying them
into concentration camps under the implicit justification of ra

cism.

Curfew and evacuation were imposed upon Japanese-Americans

because they were considered to be a greater source of danger

than people of different ancestry on the West Coast. The Court,
the military, the President and the Congress went to great

lengths to draw a fine line between racial distinctions and racial
prejudice.

The former recognized a potential source of danger

according to racial ancestry with the enemy; the latter denoted
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irrational hatred or the characteristic of racial inferiority.

The rationale of the Court, the military, the President and the
Congress applied to curfew and evacuation was tantamount to ab
surdities in sophistry.

They labled Japanese-Americans a po

tential saboteurs or war criminals and consequently disgraced them

with all the ugly connotations such lables imply.
evacuation were tantamount to criminal guilt.

Curfew and

A criminal was,

and always has been, someone substandard to social mores0

Conse

quently, criminal guilt did, and always has, denoted social in
feriority.

Japanese-Americans were considered guilty of sabotage

and espionage until proven innocent.
tantamount to social inferiority.

mount to racial inferiority.

Racial distinctions were

Social inferiority was tanta

It was no laudable distinction to

be known during World War II as a suspected saboteur or war crim

inal against one's adopted homeland or place of birth.

The Court,

the military, the President and the Congress tried to divide the
indivisable.

They could not impose curfew and evacuation upon

Japanese-Americans without treating them as criminals, and in
consequence, as social and racial inferiors.

The Court realized

it was in a delimma-filled situation: The Court was

just as much

damned as Gordom Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu in selecting any

alternative of judicial review.

It had the option of heaping

invective upon deaf ears and facing the possible consequences

of being scorned or ignored, and of possibly crippling the nation's
"power to protect;" or it could defer to public opinion and the

war power and military in a disciplined retreat with the hope

of gaining back civil libertarian ground in quieter times.

It

unanimously chose the latter in Hirabayashi and two-thirds of
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the Court chose the latter in Korematsu.

The Court followed the

pattern of deference to public opinion and the war power and
military as it did in World War I.

The Espionage Act of 1917

and the Sedition Law amendment of 1918 were both declared con

stitutional; however, they were not without subsequent cases which
established the need for the clear-and-present-danger of espionage
or sedition as justification for prosecution.
In both cases the Court made narrow rulings in the hope

that they would not further weaken those civil liberties already
threatened.

The Justices were unsure of themselves in their un

precedented situation.

They were fearful of the unseen and devas

tating ramifications of their decisions upon future civil liberties
during wartime.

The majority Justices wanted to say as little as

possible so that, as in all fields of constitutional law, they
would have future occasions to develop and qualify themselves in

the truest sense of pragmatic legal reasoning.

Endo provided the

Court an opportunity to determine the extent to which citizens
could be detained in concentration camps and the means in which

citizen-loyalty could be established for release.

Unfortunately,

Endo did not erase the racism inherent within the military orders

for curfew, evacuation and internment.

As a result, the majority

Justices elected only to sustain the curfew and exclusion orders

at the time they were promulgated and enforced and when the

petitioners violated them.

Thus Hirabayashi and Korematsu

were

deliberated in view of the gloomy months of early 1942 rather than

the relatively confident and optimistic months in 1943 and 1944.
Had they used the valuable tool of hindsight in their decision

making the majority Justices would possibly have rendered dif-
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ferent decisions.

But to do so would have surrendered the narrow

grounds of review which they believed were the paramount consider
ations in the cases.

They could have struck down the curfew and,

exclusion orders with only the possible result of exposing military

blunders.

Surely they realized the armed forces in the Pacific

would have survived unharmed by ridicule while its victorious mo

mentum carried it ever-closer to Japan. ! But this was a chance

they were not willing to take: The nation's ability to fight and

the power and prestige of the Supreme Court were still highly at
stake*

The majority Justices very likely remembered the disaster

that the Dred Scott decision rendered upon the efficacy of the

Court during the middle of the nineteenth century.

The President,

the Congress and the military did not want another Pearl Harbor
at Los Angeles; the majority Justices did not want another Dred
Scott in Hirabayashi and Korematsu: They did not want the Court
to suffer another eclipse of power.

However, Justices Roberts, Murphy and Jackson were

willing to take this chance: They were willing to judge by their
own ideals of civil liberty during wartime: They were willing to

save 70,000 Americans from second-class citizenship in spite of
the possible detriment to the Court's power and prestige.

But

this is not to enshrine these three Justices in cloaks of valor*

and integrity; the majority of the Court were equally well-in
tentioned.

Also, President Roosevelt, the Congress and the

military were equally well-intentioned in enabling this nation

to repel enemy forces and to Win the War.

Roberts, Murphy and

Jackson did not want to make what they considered "bad" consti

tutional law over highly polemical issues; the Court majority did
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not want to preclude its ability to preserve civil liberties in
the future.

idealism.

The dissenters must be highly praised for their

The affirmers, however regrettably, must be commended

for their realism.

The Hirabayashi and Korematsu decisions should not be

judged in view of rightness or wrongness.

World War II animated

the horrors of total war and the conjoining extension of the

nation's power to defend itself.

As the threats of immediate and

ubiquitous warfare developed, so did the authority of the war
power.

But today this development is a grim and sad reality, es

pecially with the development of nuclear warfare.

However, these

two decisions can be, and must be, judged by the grace of thirty

years hindsight to indicate how the Court made and honest but dis
astrous error in predicting their role as guardian of civil liberties
In the future against the war power.

The Court erred by distinguishing wartime and peacetime

as two separate, non-related situations.

Little did the Court

expect this nation to be wrapped-up in a Cold War after World War
II.

Little did it expect our participation in Korea, Viet Nam

and the Middle East,, and our "confrontations" in Berlin and Cuba,

all of which have placed this nation in a perpetual state of

national emergency.

Nor could it know that the world would soon

hurdle itself into the nuclear age after Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The threat of nuclear warfare would soon become a meanacing factor
in the conduct of world affairs.

In conjunction, this nation er

roneously viewed its history as a series of interpolating times of
"crisis" and "normalacy."

President Harding led the nation after
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World War I

with the slogan, "Back to Normalacy," and President

Truman introduced his Fair Deal after World V/ar II to consolidate

the nation's unprecedented advances in industrial production and
to steer an anxious America back to a peacetime life-style.
The Court majority desperately tried to say as little as

possible in Hirabayashi and Korematsu by reviewing them with ju
dicial self-restraint.

said too much.

But in effect, by saying little they

It was what they didn't say—their silence on the

racism against Japanese-Americans, their silence toward any prac
tical limitations on the military's exercise of the war power in

the twentieth century—that impaired the constitutional rights of

us all.

The Court majority's logic in Hirabayashi and Korematsu

could be applied to any racial minority group should future con

tingencies dictate that those having racial affiliations with the
enemy may be a greater source of danger than those who do not.

Racial discrimination under the guise of military necessity did
not definitively end with just those citizens of Japanese ancestry.

Indeed, discrimination could appear"today in any form, whether

racial, religious, or political, under the guise of military
necessity.
Hirabayashi and Korematsu still affirm the allowance of

racial distinctions or racial prejudice in formulating military
decisions.

They also consolidate the pitifully deferential nature

of the Court towards the unlimited scope of the war power.

Individual rights cannot rely in this period of our
history upon governmental stagnation for their protection.
The only safeguard is to be found in such constitutional ar
rangements as best promise that necessary things be done in
time, but that judgment be as widely representive as pos

sible .... 2~\-7iberty against government /"must be main-
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tainedj? through a better organization of the relationship
of President and Congress . . .

Contingent upon the various threats to this nation's security, the

principle of constitutional relativity can now render "absolute-"
guarantees of freedom, or civil liberties, to the vanishing point.
It is now the primary responsibility of the President and the

Congress, and not the courts, to reinstate guarantees of freedom

upon areasonable contingency basis. The war power must be held
accountable by its electorate. The "reasonableness" of this con
tingency basis is the "perpetual question" restated.

1Corwin, Total War, pp. 180-181
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